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Constitutional Legitimacy and 
Responsibility: Confronting 
Allegations of Bias After Wewaykum 
Indian Band v. Canada  
Adam M. Dodek* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most cases at the Supreme Court can be grouped into one of two 
categories: appeals where leave is granted because they contain an issue 
of public importance1 or appeals as of right in criminal cases where at 
least one justice of a provincial court of appeal has dissented.2  
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada3 began as an ordinary case in the 
first category but morphed into one of those rare cases that inhabit a 
category of their own — a Third Way if you like. In this category dwell 
those rare cases where some aspect of the Court itself becomes an issue 
                                                                                                                                
*  Director of Policy to the Hon. Michael J. Bryant, Attorney General of Ontario, Min-
ister Responsible for Native Affairs and Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal. The 
opinions expressed in this paper do not reflect the views of the Attorney General of Ontario 
or of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. Thanks to Greg Crone, Julia Hanigs-
berg, Lorne Sossin, and Ria Tzimas for reading earlier drafts of this paper and providing 
helpful comments and to Eric Davis for great research assistance. Special thanks to Murray 
Segal for his sage advice in this area. 
1  See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40. 
2  See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 691-693. Provisions for appeals to the 
Supreme Court are found in other statutes, but most notably in the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 
1985, c. S-26, ss. 35.1-41. 
3  [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, 2002 SCC 79, [2002] S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter “Wewaykum 
(No. 1)”], affirming [1999] F.C.J. No. 1529 (C.A.), motion to vacate judgment denied, [2003] 
2 S.C.R. 259, [2003] S.C.J. No. 50, 2003 SCC 45 [hereinafter“Wewaykum (No. 2)”]. For ease 
of reference, the December 2002 judgment will be referred to as “the merits judgment” or 
“the December 2002 judgment” and the September 2003 judgment will be referred to as “the 
disqualification judgment” or “the disqualification motion.” 
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on appeal; in the words of Marshall McLuhan, these are cases where the 
medium becomes the message.4 Wewaykum is such a case.5 
Wewaykum began as an important Aboriginal law case primarily 
dealing within the Crown’s fiduciary duty to First Nations. It then 
spawned an important administrative law decision addressing reason-
able apprehension of bias. However, as I argue below, Wewaykum is 
also an important constitutional case because it involved a challenge to 
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. After judgment had been rendered 
in the case, a motion was brought to vacate it on the grounds that the 
judgment was tainted by the reasonable apprehension of bias involving 
one of the nine members of the Court that heard the appeal. This was the 
first such attempt to “nullify” a decision that had been rendered by the 
Supreme Court. However, it reflected a recent international trend to 
challenge decisions or decision makers of high courts on the grounds of 
bias.  
This paper has two main parts in addition to this introduction. The 
first part is retrospective; in it I review the events and the disqualifica-
tion decision in Wewaykum. This is the necessary background and 
bridge for the focus of the paper in the second part which is decidedly 
prospective. In this part, I argue why Wewaykum is an important consti-
tutional case. I contend that judicial impartiality is a core value in our 
constitutional system and that a number of parties have duties to protect 
                                                                                                                                
4  Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill, 1964), at 7. 
5  I would include the following cases into this category: Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 455, [1999] S.C.J. No. 15 (public safety exception to solicitor-client privilege) (case 
noteworthy for sweeping publication ban, use of pseudonyms and Court direction for oral 
hearing on leave to appeal — see Adam M. Dodek, “The Public Safety Exception to Solici-
tor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones” (2001) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293); Reference re Milgaard, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 866, [1992] S.C.J. No. 35 (where Supreme Court of Canada heard viva voce 
evidence and where discussions in chambers by Chief Justice became subject of subsequent 
controversy, see “Milgaard Witness Gets Protection” Toronto Star (20 February 1992); 
“Milgaard Key Witness Tells Court: I’m Afraid” Toronto Star (20 February 1992); “Ex-
bikers Reveal Mystery Milgaard Witness” Toronto Star (21 February 1992); “Can’t Help 
Milgaard, Mystery Woman Says” Toronto Star (22 February 1992); “Witness Said Trying to 
Settle a Score” Regina Leader Post (3 March 1992) A2; “Mystery Woman Willing to Tes-
tify” Regina Leader Post (22 February 1992) A1; “Witness Said Husband Lied at 1970 Trial” 
Regina Leader Post (20 February 1992) A1; “Witness Upset with Protection Plan” Saskatoon 
Star Phoenix (3 June 1995) A1; “Fearful Witness Given Police Protection” Saskatoon Star 
Phoenix (20 February 1992) A1). 
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the guardians of our Constitution, the Supreme Court of Canada. In 
response to the age old question of Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? 
— who guards the guardians — I argue that Parliament, the bar and the 
Court itself each have a duty to protect the integrity of the Court. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
1. Chronology 
On December 6, 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered 
judgment on the merits in Wewaykum.6 The unanimous judgment of the 
full nine member bench was written by Binnie J. Two Indian bands in 
British Columbia each claimed the other’s reserve land and each 
claimed breach of fiduciary duty against the federal Crown. The Federal 
Court and the Federal Court of Appeal rejected their claims and the 
Supreme Court dismissed their appeals.7 
After release of the Court’s reasons, the solicitor for one of the 
bands reviewed the reasons with the band who were upset by both the 
tone and the result of the appeal. According to counsel, they decided to 
make a freedom of information request as a way to help quell any con-
cerns by the losing band that there was anything untoward in the deci-
sion.8 In February 2003, one of the unsuccessful Indian bands made a 
request under the Access to Information Act9 seeking: 
… copies of all records, including letters, correspondence and internal 
memoranda to, from or which make reference to Mr. William Binnie 
(Ian Binnie) [now Justice Binnie] in the matter of the claim against 
Canada by the Wewaykum (or Campbell River) Indian Band and the 
                                                                                                                                
6  Wewaykum (No. 1), supra, note 3. 
7  For more information on the merits judgment, see Leonard I. Rotman, “Wewaykum: 
A New Spin on the Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations to Aboriginal Peoples?” Pacific Business 
& Law Institute, Ottawa, 10-11 September 2003 [unpublished]; E. Ria Tzimas, “Wewaykum: 
An Opportunity to Review Fiduciary Law in Canadian Aboriginal Jurisprudence” Second 
Annual Aboriginal Law Forum, Insight Information Co., Toronto, 17-18 November 2003 
[unpublished]. 
8  Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at paras. 16-18. 
9  R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1. 
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Wewaikai (or Cape Mudge) Indian Band for Quinsam IR 12 and 
Campbell River IR 11 between the years 1982 and 1986.10 
The Department of Justice received the access to information re-
quest and found a number of internal memoranda to, from or making 
reference to Binnie and related to Campbell River’s claim. These 
memoranda showed that in late 1985 and early 1986, in his capacity at 
the time as Associate Deputy Minister, Justice Binnie received some 
information and attended a meeting in the early stages of Campbell 
River’s claim against Canada.  
On May 23, 2003, the Assistant Deputy Attorney General wrote to 
the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada to inform her that as a 
result of the preparation of the Department of Justice’s response to the 
access to information request, it appeared “that Mr. W.I.C. Binnie in 
1985 and early 1986, in the course of his duties as Associate Deputy 
Minister of Justice, participated in discussions with Department of Jus-
tice counsel in the Wewaykum [Campbell River] Indian Band case.”11 
Accompanying this letter were documents relating to Mr. Binnie’s in-
volvement in the case over which the Department waived solicitor-client 
privilege in view of its duty as an officer of the Court.  
Canada also filed a motion for directions pursuant to Rule 3 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court, as to what steps, if any, should be taken by 
reason of the information contained in the Assistant Deputy Attorney 
General’s letter. The following factual information was set out in a 
Statement attached to the letter: 
1. The case of Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] S.C.C. 79, 
file no. 27641 was heard in the Supreme Court of Canada on 
December 6, 2001 and judgment was rendered December 6, 2002. 
2. The original claim in the case was filed in December 1985 and the 
original Defense on behalf of the Crown was filed on February 
28, 1986. 
3. The trial judgment was released by the Federal Court Trial 
Division on September 19, 1995 and the appeal judgment was 
released on October 12, 1999 by the Federal Court of Appeal. 
                                                                                                                                
10  Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 15. 
11  Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 19. 
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4. Mr. W.I.C. Binnie was Associate Deputy Minister from 
September 2nd, 1982 until July 31st, 1986; at that time he left the 
Department of Justice and entered private practice. 
5. As Associate Deputy Minister, Mr. Binnie’s duties included 
responsibility for all litigation, civil as well as criminal matters, 
involving the Government of Canada as a party, arising in the 
common law provinces and territories in Canada; in that context 
he would have had under his general supervisory authority 
thousands of cases. In addition to his responsibilities for litigation, 
Mr. Binnie was also responsible for Native Law in the 
Department. 
6. In the course of preparation of a response to a request for 
information under the Access to Information Act received in 
February 2003, it has come to light that Mr. Binnie had occasion 
to discuss the case with Department counsel, in late 1985 and 
early 1986. 
7. In the course of preparing for the hearing of the case before the 
Supreme Court of Canada, Department of Justice counsel noted 
the fact of Mr. Binnie’s position as Associate Deputy Minister in 
1985 and 1986, and asked themselves whether Mr. Binnie had had 
any specific involvement in the case. 
8. Counsel did not conduct a thorough examination of the files. 
Consequently, Mr. Binnie’s involvement was not discovered by 
counsel at that time.12 
After the Crown’s Motion for Directions was filed with the Court, 
Binnie J. filed the following statement in the form of a memorandum 
with the Registrar of the Court: 
 With respect to the Motion for Directions filed yesterday by the 
Crown, would you please place this note on the Court file and 
communicate its contents to counsel for the parties. 
 It is a matter of public record that between September 1982 and 
July 1986 I was Associate Deputy Minister of Justice responsible for 
all litigation for and against the federal Crown except tax matters and 
cases in Quebec. This included Indian claims. At any given time, the 
responsibility covered several thousand cases. 
                                                                                                                                
12  Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 20. 
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 When this appeal was pending before the Court in 2002, I had no 
recollection of personal involvement 17 years earlier at the 
commencement of this particular file, which was handled by 
departmental counsel in the Vancouver Regional Office. 
 I do not recall anything about any involvement in this case to add 
to what is set out in the departmental file. 
 I recuse myself from consideration of the pending motion.13 
The Court invited further submissions by the parties respecting the 
Crown’s motion for directions. The Crown responded by filing a memo-
randum in which it asserted that there was no reasonable apprehension 
of bias. In response, one of the Indian bands sought an order setting 
aside the Court’s judgment and requesting that the Court recommend 
that the parties enter into a negotiation and reconciliation process.14  The 
other Indian Band, supported by several other intervener Bands, sought 
an order vacating the Court’s judgment. The Crown, supported by the 
Attorney General of British Columbia, as intervener, submitted that 
there was no reasonable apprehension of bias and therefore the motions 
to vacate should be dismissed.15 
The Court heard the motion under an abridged timetable. While oral 
hearings for leave to appeal applications have generally been abandoned 
by the Court, it still hears some motions orally, usually on the first 
Monday of each session. It scheduled a special sitting for the We-
waykum disqualification motion, after it had completed hearing all of 
the cases for its spring session in 2003. The Court was very engaged in 
the issues before it, with the Chief Justice extending time for counsel to 
make their arguments. Nearly three hours after the motion began on 
Monday, June 23, 2003, the Court finally recessed for the summer after 
a hearing that raised more questions than it answered. 
                                                                                                                                
13  Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 23. 
14  Id., at para. 24. In the alternative, this Band sought an order suspending the opera-
tion of the judgment for four months to permit negotiation and reconciliation between the 
parties with further submissions to the Court if required: id. 
15  Id., at paras. 25-27. The Attorney General of Ontario who had intervened in the mer-
its hearing, took no position and did not participate in the disqualification motion. 
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2. The Disqualification Judgment 
The Court — minus Binnie J. — reviewed the 17 documents and 
determined that no reasonable apprehension of bias existed to warrant 
Binnie J.’s disqualification. The Court highlighted the importance of 
impartiality and its presumption in our judicial system. It then clarified 
that there was a single standard for disqualification in Canada — that of 
reasonable apprehension of bias. In applying the test of reasonable ap-
prehension of bias to the facts before it, the Court made three notable 
preliminary observations: (1) that the standard for demonstrating a rea-
sonable apprehension of bias was high; (2) that these cases are highly 
fact-specific; and (3) when disqualification arises after judgment, in-
quiry into whether or not the judge would have recused himself or her-
self is not determinative. 
Turning to the merits of the motion, in ruling that no reasonable ap-
prehension of bias existed, the Court emphasized the following factors: 
(1) that Binnie J. had not been counsel in the case; (2) the passage of 
time; (3) Binnie J.’s lack of recollection of the matters of the case; and 
(4) the decision-making process of the Court. Each is discussed in turn 
below. 
(a) Restrictive Reading of Counsel 
The Court adopted a narrow definition of “counsel” for the purposes 
of disqualification. The generally accepted rule is that no judge should 
sit in a case in which he or she acted as counsel at any stage of the pro-
ceeding. In applying this rule in Wewaykum, the Court adopted a differ-
ent position than the more absolute rule encompassed by the statement 
of Laskin C.J. that judges “would not sit in any case in which they 
played any part at any stage of the case.”16 Instead, the Court adopted a 
more flexible rule which accords with the differences between private 
and government practice. 
The Court stated that it could not realistically be held that Binnie J. 
acted as counsel in this case. Rather the Court stated that his role was of 
                                                                                                                                
16  Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 
at 388 cited in Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 80. 
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“a limited supervisory and administrative nature.”17 The Court accepted 
that Binnie J.’s involvement with the litigation “exceeded pro forma 
management of the files” but noted that “he was never counsel of re-
cord, and played no active role in the dispute after the claim was 
filed.”18 In so holding, the Court held that a reasonable person would 
have to take into account the characteristics of legal practice within the 
Department of Justice, as compared to private practice in a law firm.19 
The Court cited the Canadian Judicial Council’s Ethical Principles for 
Judges, which, with respect, is not of particular assistance on this issue. 
The Ethical Principles state the general rule that “circumstances must be 
avoided in which a reasonable, fair minded and informed person would 
have a reasoned suspicion that the judge is not impartial.” They proceed 
to give some general guidelines, as follows: 
 
(a) A judge who was in private practice should not sit on any case in 
which the judge or the judge’s former firm was directly involved as 
either counsel of record or in any other capacity before the judge’s 
appointment. 
(b) Where the judge practised for government or legal aid, guideline (a) 
cannot be applied strictly. One sensible approach is not to sit on 
cases commenced in the particular local office prior to the judge’s 
appointment.20 
 
The standard adopted by the Court in Wewaykum purposely eschews 
the bright-line rule advocated by Laskin C.J. in favour of a flexible 
approach to determining the import and the impact played by a judge’s 
prior involvement and balances that with other factors in the case as 
discussed below. 
                                                                                                                                
17  Id., at para. 82. 
18  Id., at para. 83. 
19  Id., at para. 84. 
20  Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial 
Council, 1998), at 47. 
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(b) Passage of Time and Binnie J.’s Lack of Recollection 
The Court held that the passage of time was a “significant” factor it 
is finding that no reasonable apprehension of bias existed. Justice Bin-
nie’s involvement in the case dated back at least 15 years from the time 
that the case first was heard at the Supreme Court. In addition, the Court 
also noted that Binnie J.’s lack of recollection (as reflected in his state-
ment filed with the Court) was relevant. Justice Binnie’s statement was 
not challenged and it is difficult to see how it could have been, except 
by the filing of other contradictory evidence. This procedure, as unusual 
as it appears, is preferable to procedure followed in some other jurisdic-
tions, where the judge includes factual statements about his or her in-
volvement for the first time in the decision on a disqualification 
motion.21 
The approach adopted by the Supreme Court was a sensible and 
pragmatic one. There are times when the notion of the “reasonable per-
son” or the “reasonable apprehension of bias” seems quite distant from 
everyday reality. However, these two factors are precisely the sorts of 
things that the ordinary “reasonable person” would likely consider rele-
vant in considering a judge’s impartiality. 
(c) The Nature of the Supreme Court 
The disqualification judgment was revealing and notable for its dis-
cussion of the decision making process of the Supreme Court. This 
discussion was insightful to Court watchers and the public as well as 
being an exercise in risk management for the Court. During the hearing 
of the motion, Deschamps J. queried counsel on whether it made a 
                                                                                                                                
21  One could imagine a situation where a judge denies any recollection of the matters 
before the Court but evidence exists of the judge making reference to them in a public address 
or article. Short of this, it is difficult to conceive of the prospect of cross-examining a judge 
on a statement filed with this Court. As uncomfortable as the procedure followed by Binnie J. 
and the Court was in this case, it is clearly the preferable course of action. It is superior to the 
practice followed by the United States Supreme Court where no such statements are filed but 
justices, in the course of recusal or disqualification motions, include such statements of fact in 
their written reasons for decision on the motion with no opportunity for any party to rebut 
them or comment upon their legal ramification. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) 
(motion to disqualify Rehnquist J. after judgment rendered) and Cheney v. U.S. District 
Court, 18 March 2004 (motion to recuse Scalia J. before case was heard). 
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difference whether the Court was composed of nine members or a single 
judge sitting alone and asked further whether a reasonable person takes 
into account the way the Court operates.22 The problem with this point, 
as with much regarding the mythical reasonable person, is that the work 
of the Supreme Court is not well-known to lawyers, let alone to litigants 
or to members of the public. Only a few articles have been written on 
this subject23 and when Supreme Court justices do feel comfortable 
discussing this subject, it is usually to legal audiences and the message 
does not get well-disseminated. 
In Wewaykum, the Supreme Court addressed this vacuum by filling 
it. It stated as follows: 
 The decision-making process within the Supreme Court of 
Canada, while not widely known, is a matter of public record. . . . For 
present purposes, it is enough to say the following. Each member of 
the Supreme Court prepares independently for the hearing of appeals. 
All judges are fully prepared, and no member of the Court is assigned 
the task to go through the case so as to “brief” the rest of the coram 
before the hearing. After the case is heard, each judge on the coram 
expresses his or her opinion independently. Discussions take place on 
who will prepare draft reasons, and whether for the majority or the 
minority. Draft reasons are then prepared and circulated by one or 
more judges. These reasons are the fruit of a truly collegial process of 
revision of successive drafts. In that sense, it can be said that reasons 
express the individual views of each and every judge who signs them, 
and the collective effort and opinion of them all.24  
This appears to be the first time that the Court took the unusual step of 
explaining its process of decision making in a reported decision. 
The explanation of its process also allowed the Court to engage in a 
form of risk management against future disqualification motions. Prior 
                                                                                                                                
22  See Transcript of Proceedings in Court File No. 27641, June 23, 2003, at 16-17. 
23  See John Sopinka, “The Supreme Court of Canada” in Brian A. Crane & Henry S. 
Brown, Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2002 (Toronto: Carswell, 2002), at 393; Lorne 
Sossin, “The Sounds of Silence: Law Clerks, Policy Making and the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (1996) 30 U.B.C. L. Rev. 279; Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a 
Difference” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507; Bertha Wilson, “Decision-making in the 
Supreme Court” (1986) 36 U.T.L.J. 227; and Robert Martin, “Ideology and Judging in the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 797. 
24  Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 92. 
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to Wewaykum, the general rule is that a judgment tainted by bias cannot 
stand and is vacated.25 In Wewaykum, the Court departed from the strict 
rule that bias of a single judge taints the entire panel and the judgment:  
 Here, the nine judges who sat on these appeals shared the same 
view as to the disposition of the appeals and the reasons for judgment. 
Cases where the tainted judge casts the deciding vote in a split 
decision are inapposite in this respect. In the circumstances of the 
present case, even if it were found that the involvement of a single 
judge gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, no reasonable 
person informed of the decision-making process of the Court, and 
viewing it realistically, could conclude that it was likely that the eight 
other judges were biased, or somehow tainted, by the apprehended 
bias affecting the ninth judge.26  
This passage is a form of risk management and prevention. First, it 
protects the Court if there is a finding of bias against a single judge. 
Vacating a Supreme Court judgment presents a number of serious ob-
stacles because of the uncertainty of what happens in this situation. 
There are a number of possibilities. First, as mooted by Iacobucci J. 
during the oral hearing of the motion, was that the Court could have 
vacated its judgment and let the Court of Appeal decision stand.27 A 
second option would be a rehearing of the case without the disqualified 
judge. A third option could be to disqualify the entire Court and strike a 
panel of ad-hoc Supreme Court justices drawn from the Federal Court.28 
                                                                                                                                
25  Newfoundland Telephone v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public 
Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623, at 645, [1992] S.C.J. No. 21. 
26 Wewaykum (No. 2), supra, note 3, at para. 93. 
27 See Transcript of Proceedings in Court File No. 27641, 23 June 2003, at 12 (per 
Iacobucci J.) 
28 See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 30 (appointment of ad hoc judge). 
This section provides, in pertinent part:  
(1) Where at any time there is not a quorum of the judges available to hold or 
continue any session of the Court, owing to a vacancy or vacancies, or to the absence 
through illness or on leave or in the discharge of other duties assigned by statute or or-
der in council, or to the disqualification of a judge or judges, the Chief Justice of 
Canada, or in the absence of the Chief Justice, the senior puisne judge, may in writing 
request the attendance at the sittings of the Court, as an ad hoc judge, for such period 
as may be necessary, 
(a) of a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court or the Tax 
Court of Canada; or 
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The Supreme Court’s statement above in Wewaykum obviates the need 
to consider these options in most cases. 
Wewaykum is also an exercise in disqualification motion prevention. 
Given the Court’s statement on the effects of a finding of bias against a 
single judge, parties are now on notice that this will be unlikely to void 
a judgment of the Court. This will likely deter parties in the future from 
bringing motions for disqualification after judgment. 
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
1. Overview 
In Wewaykum, the need for reform was conceded by counsel for the 
Crown in the disqualification motion.29 I want to distinguish between 
the operational and the constitutional imperative for reforms in this 
area. The operational case for reform was clearly demonstrated in We-
waykum: the disclosure of Binnie J.’s prior involvement with the issues 
in the case should not have occurred after the Court had rendered judg-
ment on the merits. As acknowledged by counsel for the Crown and 
clearly in the mind of the Court at the hearing of the disqualification 
motion, counsel could have discovered Binnie J.’s prior involvement 
before the hearing of the case on its merits. The constitutional impera-
tive for reform is less straightforward. As explained below, this argu-
ment is based on the premise that a challenge to the impartiality of the 
                                                                                                                                
(b) if the judges of the Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court or the Tax 
Court of Canada are absent from Ottawa or for any reason are unable to sit, 
of a judge of a provincial superior court to be designated in writing by the 
chief justice, or in the absence of the chief justice, by any acting chief jus-
tice or the senior puisne judge of that provincial court on that request being 
made to that acting chief justice or that senior puisne judge in writing. 
 See generally Reynald Boult, “Ad Hoc Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada” 
(1978) 26 Chitty’s L.J. 289. The author thanks Madame Anne Roland, Registrar of the Su-
preme Court of Canada, for bringing this article to his attention. According to this article, the 
last time section 30 was used to appoint an ad hoc judge was in 1947.  
29  “Should there be some examination as to improving the system for the future? 
Should there be an analysis of systems of procedures within the department? Perhaps. But 
that has nothing to do with the decision that you are asked to make on whether or not to 
vacate.” Transcript of Proceedings in Court File No. 27641, 23 June 2003, at 60 (per Mr. J. 
Vincent O’Donnell). 
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Supreme Court is an assault on our constitutional foundations. To be 
absolutely clear, in characterizing a challenge to the impartiality of the 
Supreme Court in such terms, I am referring to the seriousness of such 
allegations, not to the motives of those who bring them. However, the 
constitutional gravity of allegations of bias against the Supreme Court 
warrants heightened vigilance by all parties concerned. Indeed, I con-
tend that all parties have a duty to protect the integrity of the Court’s 
process which is captured in the idea of the collaborative constitutional 
duties of the bench, bar and the Legislature discussed below.  
2. Constitutional Imperative  
In the introduction, I asserted that Wewaykum was an important 
constitutional case. This is developed in more detail below, but in a 
nutshell, judicial impartiality should be considered a constitutional norm 
together with its twin, judicial independence. Because the Supreme 
Court is a constitutional organ,30 when its impartiality is questioned, an 
issue of serious constitutional proportion exists. Let me try to unpack 
these ideas. 
Section 11(d) of the Charter confers upon a person “charged with an 
offence” the right to a fair and public hearing by “an independent and 
impartial tribunal.” In Valente,31 the Supreme Court explained the twin 
concepts of “independence” and “impartiality.” This case involved a 
challenge under section 11(d) to the system of appointing and remuner-
ating Ontario’s provincial court judges. The Court explained that the 
two concepts of “independence” and “impartiality” were related but 
each contained separate values or requirements. “Impartiality” refers to 
a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in relation to the issues and the 
parties in a particular case. “Independence” reflects or embodies the 
                                                                                                                                
30  See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 101 (providing for General Court of Appeal for Can-
ada) and Constitution Act, 1982, s. 41(d) (providing that an amendment to the Constitution in 
relation to the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada may only be made upon the 
unanimous consent of the Senate, the House of Commons and the legislatures of each prov-
ince) and s. 42(1)(d) (providing that an amendment to the Constitution in relation to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, other than its composition, may only be made upon resolutions of 
the Senate and the House of Commons and resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least 
two-thirds of the provinces that have, in the aggregate at least 50 per cent of the population of 
all the provinces). 
31  R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77 [hereinafter “Valente”]. 
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traditional constitutional value of judicial independence and connotes 
not only a state of mind but also a status or relationship to others — 
particularly the Executive branch of government — that rests on objec-
tive conditions or guarantees. Judicial independence has both an indi-
vidual and institutional component. The individual component 
encompasses such matters as security of tenure and the institutional 
independence of the court is reflected in its institutional or administra-
tion relationships to the Executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment. The test for both impartiality and independence focuses on 
“perception” — the “reasonable apprehension” of bias or lack of inde-
pendence, as the case may be. 
Judicial independence and impartiality extend beyond section 11(d) 
of the Charter. Section 7 provides that everyone has “the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” The 
“principles of fundamental justice” include the right to a fair trial which 
includes the notion of an independent and impartial tribunal.32 There-
fore, anytime life, liberty or security of the person is at issue, impartial-
ity is constitutionally mandated. However, I think it is fair to conclude 
that the requirement of judicial impartiality extends beyond the scope of 
section 7 and constitutionally permeates all judicial proceedings. 
Judicial impartiality, like judicial independence, is likely one of the 
unwritten constitutional principles of our Constitution. In the Provincial 
Judges Reference, the Supreme Court held that the “constitutional 
home” for judicial independence was found in the Preamble to the Con-
stitution which recognizes that Canada has a “Constitution similar in 
Principle to that of the United Kingdom.”33 The Court held that sections 
96-100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and section 11(d) of the Charter 
did not provide an “exhaustive and definitive code” for judicial inde-
pendence34 but rather provide proof of the existence of a general princi-
ple of judicial independence that applies to all courts no matter what 
                                                                                                                                
32  R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 93, [1997] S.C.J. No. 84 [hereinafter 
“R.D.S.”]. 
33  Provincial Judges Reference, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, at para. 109, 
citing the Constitution Act, 1867. 
34  Id., at paras. 83, 85. 
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type of cases they hear.35 Similar reasoning can be applied to judicial 
impartiality. 
The nexus between judicial independence and judicial impartiality 
supports the conclusion that impartiality should also be considered an 
unwritten constitutional norm. As recognized by the Supreme Court, 
courts hold a central place within the Canadian system of government 
and are part of the “basic structure of our Constitution.”36 Judicial im-
partiality is one of the bedrock principles of our legal system. It is fun-
damental not only to the capacity to do justice in a particular case but 
also to individual and public confidence in the administration of justice. 
To this end, the Supreme Court has stated that “[w]ithout that confi-
dence the system cannot command the respect and acceptance that are 
essential to its effective operation.”37  
The link between judicial impartiality and judicial independence has 
been best articulated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa: “judi-
cial impartiality and the application without fear, favour or prejudice by 
the courts of the Constitution and all law . . . are inherent in an ac-
cused’s right to a fair trial. . . One of the main goals of institutional 
judicial independence is to safeguard such rights.”38 In similar fashion, 
the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R.D.S. that “[a] system of justice, 
if it is to have the respect and confidence of its society, must ensure that 
trials are fair and that they appear to be fair to the informed and reason-
able observer. This is a fundamental goal of the justice system in any 
free and democratic society.”39  
The simple point that I am attempting to make here is that allega-
tions of bias strike at the heart of our system of justice. They become all 
the more serious when they are leveled at our system’s highest court and 
constitutional arbiter.40 It is for this reason that I argue that all players in 
                                                                                                                                
35  Id., at para. 107. 
36  Id., at para. 108, citing O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 48, at 57. 
37  R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, [1985] S.C.J. No. 77, at para. 22. 
38  S. v. Van Rooyen, [2002] S.A.J. No. 39, at para. 35. 
39  R. v. R.D.S, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 91, [1997] S.C.J. No. 84. 
40  The Supreme Court is itself a constitutional organ. See Constitutional Act, 1867, su-
pra, note 33, s. 101. There is a debate on the extent to which Parliament may change aspects 
of the Court without constitutional amendment. See “Improving the Supreme Court of Canada 
Appointments Process,” Report of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public 
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the legal system have a role to play in protecting the integrity of the 
Supreme Court’s decision making process. 
In the last several years, attacks on the institutional legitimacy of 
high courts have increased in frequency. In South Africa, a motion was 
brought to recuse five of 11 justices of the Constitutional Court, in part 
on the grounds of the justices past affiliations with the governing Afri-
can National Congress (ANC).41 The allegation was that the members of 
the Court could not be impartial in a case where President Mandela was 
a party because of their connections to him or the ANC. The Court 
called the application for recusal “unprecedented . . . implicating each of 
the judges of this Court, questioning their impartiality, and impugning 
the integrity of the Court as an institution.”42 The application was dis-
missed.  
In Great Britain, the Law Lords received a black eye when their ini-
tial decision in the Pinochet case43 was vacated because of a finding that 
Lord Hoffman was automatically disqualified from hearing the case 
because of his connections to Amnesty International which was a party 
before the Court. In the United States, Scalia J.’s refusal to recuse him-
self in a case involving Vice-President Cheney with whom the Justice 
had gone duck hunting, became a lightning rod for criticism against 
Scalia and the Supreme Court in 2004. The criticism was particularly 
strident coming in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush 
v. Gore44 which badly scarred that Court’s legitimacy.45 In short, 
                                                                                                                                
Safety and Emergency Preparedness (May 2004) available online at: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
InfocomDoc/Documents/37/3/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/justrp01/justrp01-e.pdf>. 
41  South Africa (President) v. South African Rugby Football Union, [1999] S.A.J. No. 
22. The recusal application alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias against all 11 members 
of the Court but targeted five of the justices by name because “after careful consideration” the 
applicant had decided to “leave it to the conscience” of the other members of the Court 
whether to recuse themselves. Id., at para. 6. 
42  Id., at para. 7. 
43  R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No. 2), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272, [1999] 1 All E.R. 577, [1998] H.L.J. No. 52 [hereinafter 
“Pinochet”]. 
44  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000). 
45  A collective negative judgment about the Supreme Court’s performance in this case 
risks developing a “gnawing sense of illegitimacy [which] eats away at the fabric of mutual 
confidence.” Bruce Ackerman, “Introduction” in Bruce Ackerman, ed., Bush v. Gore: The 
Question of Legitimacy (New York and London: Yale University Press, 2002) vii, at viii. 
Constitutional giant Laurence Tribe expressed the fear that this decision may become 
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accusations of bias against a justice of the country’s highest court are a 
direct result on the integrity of the Court itself and its place in the con-
stitutional system.  
3. Constitutional Responsibilities: Parliament, the Court and the Bar  
Because the Supreme Court is a constitutional organ, it requires 
more stringent standards to protect its process. This calls for heightened 
measures by each of the three members of the constitutional “troika” 
that interact with the Supreme Court: the bar, Parliament and the Court 
itself. Wewaykum does not directly address the issue of what sort of 
measures are needed or recommended, however, this issue surfaced 
from time to time throughout the hearing of the disqualification motion. 
Each of these three organs — the legislature, the Court and the bar 
— have a role to play in preserving the integrity of the Supreme Court 
and ultimately of the Constitution. Indeed, I would argue that they share 
a responsibility under our Constitution to do so. Generally, we only talk 
about duties on behalf of government to uphold the Constitution 
                                                                                                                                
America’s “judicial Vietnam” — undermining confidence in that country’s judiciary even 
when dramatic interventions are constitutionally imperative.” See Laurence Tribe id. See also 
Bruce Ackerman, “Introduction” in Bruce Ackerman, ed., Bush v. Gore: The Question of 
Legitimacy (New York and London: Yale University Press, 2002) vii, at ix; Alan M. Der-
showitz, Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000 (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Jed Rubenfeld has called the decision “worse even 
than the notorious Plessy [v. Ferguson] and it makes Roe [v. Wade] look like an exemplar of 
principled decision making.” Jeb Rubenfeld, “Not as Bad as Plessy. Worse.” in Bruce Ac-
kerman, ed., Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy (New York and London: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2002) 20, at 20-21. Some of the harshest criticism of the Supreme Court’s 
decision has come from Ronald Dworkin who has called Bush v. Gore “one of the least 
persuasive Supreme Court opinions that I have ever read.” Ronald Dworkin, “Early Re-
sponses” in Ronald Dworkin, ed., Bush v. Gore: A Badly Flawed Election (New York: The 
New Press, 2002) 57, at 62. Dworkin concluded that he “continue[s] to think that the Court’s 
decision is inexplicable except on grounds that concede its illegitimacy.” Ronald Dworkin, 
“Introduction” in Ronald Dworkin, ed., Bush v. Gore: A Badly Flawed Election (New York: 
The New Press, 2002) 1, at 2. Bush v. Gore does certainly have its defenders: see Richard A. 
Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution and The Courts (Prince-
ton, Princeton University Press, 2001); Richard A. Posner, “Bush v. Gore as Pragmatic 
Adjudication” in Ronald Dworkin, ed., Bush v. Gore: A Badly Flawed Election (New York: 
The New Press, 2002), at 187; Charles Fried, “An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable 
Decision” in Bruce Ackerman, ed., Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy (New York and 
London: Yale University Press, 2002) at 3. However, the inescapable conclusion is that Bush 
v. Gore has seriously injured the Court’s credibility. 
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whereas individuals have rights under the Constitution which they seek 
to enforce against the government. However, the constitutional status of 
these organs, particularly the privileged status of an independent bar 
under our Constitution,46 carries a concomitant responsibility to preserve 
the very Constitution from which their status flows. 
(a) Parliament 
At present, Parliament’s rules regarding disqualification of Supreme 
Court justices are minimal and do not provide sufficient direction in this 
area. Section 28, entitled “When a Judge may not sit,” provides only 
that “No judge against whose judgment an appeal is brought, or who 
took part in the trial of the cause or matter, or in the hearing in a court 
below, shall sit or take part in the hearing of or adjudication on the pro-
ceedings in the Supreme Court.”47 There are no known judicial interpre-
tations of this section. To begin, it is not clear if this provision applies 
only to a judge who participated in the case below qua judge or also 
extends to the situation where a judge participated in some manner in 
the case below qua lawyer. Section 28 was not cited by the Court in 
Wewaykum which would lend support to the conclusion that the provi-
sion only includes the former but not the latter.  
Parliament should follow the lead in other jurisdictions which have 
codified both the circumstances and the procedure for disqualification. 
In the U.S., Congress has a disqualification law that applies to all fed-
eral judges.48 This law provides the circumstances under which a federal 
                                                                                                                                
46  See Roy Millen, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles and the Enforceability of the 
Independence of the Bar” [unpublished paper]. 
47  Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 28(1). 
48  28.U.S.C. § 455. This section provides: 
Sec. 455. – Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge  
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify 
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:  
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;  
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, 
or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such as-
sociation as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has 
been a material witness concerning it;  
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(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity par-
ticipated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding 
or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in con-
troversy;  
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor 
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter 
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;  
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either 
of them, or the spouse of such a person:  
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a 
party;  
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;  
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially af-
fected by the outcome of the proceeding;  
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the pro-
ceeding.  
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial in-
terests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial in-
terests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.  
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have the 
meaning indicated:  
(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of liti-
gation;  
(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law system;  
(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, 
and guardian;  
(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, how-
ever small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant 
in the affairs of a party, except that:  
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securi-
ties is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge par-
ticipates in the management of the fund;  
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic 
organization is not a “financial interest” in securities held by the 
organization;  
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance com-
pany, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar pro-
prietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the organization only if the 
outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the 
interest;  
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest” in the is-
suer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect 
the value of the securities.  
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the pro-
ceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). 
Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be 
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judge must disqualify himself or herself and the circumstances where 
disqualification may be waived by the parties upon the full disclosure by 
the judge on the record of the circumstances surrounding the basis for 
disqualification.49 Similarly, in Quebec, specific provisions of the Code 
of Civil Procedure address recusal.50 Sections 234 and 235 of Quebec’s 
Code of Civil Procedure set out the grounds for recusal51 while section 
236 provides that if a judge or a lawyer is aware of possible grounds for 
recusal, he or she must declare it in writing which is to be filed in the 
                                                                                                                                
accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for dis-
qualification.  
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, 
magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be 
disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of 
the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she 
individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her 
household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, 
magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests 
himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification. 
49  See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e). 
50  Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1978, c. C-25, ss. 234-242. 
51  Section 234. A judge may be recused in particular: 
(1) If the judge is the spouse of or related or allied within the degree of cousin-
german inclusively to one of the parties; 
(2) If the judge is himself or herself a party to an action involving a question 
similar to the one in dispute; 
(3) If the judge has given advice upon the matter in dispute, or has previously 
taken cognizance of it as an arbitrator, if the judge has acted as attorney for any of the 
parties, or if the judge has made known his or her opinion extra-judicially; 
(4) If the judge is directly interested in an action pending before a court in which 
any of the parties will be called to sit as judge; 
(5) If there is mortal enmity between him or her and any of the parties, or if the 
judge has made threats against any of the parties, since the institution of the action or 
within six months previous to the proposed recusation; 
(6) If the judge is the legal representative, the mandatary or the administrator of 
the property of a party to the suit, or if the judge is, in relation to one of the parties, a 
successor or a donee; 
(7) If the judge is a member of an association, partnership or legal person, or is 
manager or patron of some order or community which is a party to the suit; 
(8) If the judge has any interest in favouring any of the parties; 
(9) If the judge is the spouse of or is related or allied to the attorney or counsel or 
to the partner of any of them, either in the direct line, or in the collateral line in the 
second degree; 
(10) if there is reasonable cause to fear that the judge will not be impartial. 
235. A judge is disqualified if he or his spouse is interested in the action. 
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court record and other parties must be notified. Section 237 includes a 
“diligence” requirement for the bringing of a motion for recusal. Section 
238 provides that the judge against whom recusal is sought hears the 
motion which is subject to the normal rules regarding interlocutory 
appeals. Section 239 to 241 provide for notice to the Chief Judge and 
address the consequences of recusal. Section 242 provides that the par-
ties may waive (in writing) any basis for recusal of a judge, except 
where the judge or the judge’s spouse has an interest in the action. 
Neither the U.S. Code nor Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure pro-
vide a “complete code” for recusal and disqualification, but they do 
provide a strong basis for the substantive grounds for disqualification. 
Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure details the procedure to be followed 
for disqualification motions. For the Supreme Court of Canada, such 
procedures are generally contained in the Supreme Court Rules which 
the Rules Committee of the Court itself develops. 
(b) The Court 
Unless and until Parliament fills the void, the Court will be forced to 
protect itself. Disclosure — by both counsel and the Court — is impera-
tive to ensure the integrity of the judicial process. Current guidance in 
this area is limited and in need of expansion. The Ethical Principles for 
Judges states on the one hand that a judge should disclose on the record 
anything which might support a plausible argument in favour of dis-
qualification while on the other hand stating that a judge should make 
disclosure on the record and invite submissions from the parties in only 
two situations. Provisions of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure man-
date such disclosure.52 The Court must be its own first line of defence 
by internally tracking judges’ connections to matters before it. To a 
large extent this is likely already being done. Erecting a protective fire-
wall around the Court is necessary but not sufficient to insulate the 
Court from reasonable apprehension of bias. Counsel is often in a better 
position than the Court regarding information about a justice’s connec-
tions to the case. 
                                                                                                                                
52 Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1978, c. C-25, s. 236 ( “. . . a party who is aware of 
a ground of recusation against the judge must declare it without delay in a writing filed in the 
record and notify a copy to the judge and to the other parties”). 
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The Court needs the assistance of others. It should, either by way of 
rule or Notice to the Profession, instruct all counsel appearing before the 
Court that if they have any information regarding the involvement of a 
member of the Court with a case before it, counsel is obliged to bring 
that information to the Court’s attention. Thus, it is suggested that in 
order to prevent future Wewaykums, the Registrar of the Supreme Court 
issue a Practice Direction instructing counsel to bring to the Court’s 
attention any connection that one of the judges may have to the case 
before the Court which could possibly lead to the consideration of 
recusal or disqualification from the case. The suggested threshold is 
deliberately lower than the actual standard for disqualification. This is 
because disclosure of one issue may lead the Judge or other counsel to 
consider the issue further and find additional information which may in 
fact lead to a determination that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists 
and the judge should not sit. Or not.53 
How should the Court address various operational issues regarding 
bias applications? In Wewaykum, the Court stated that the standard of 
                                                                                                                                
53  For example, it is well known that LeBel J. was batonnier of the Barreau du Quebec 
in 1983 and 1984. See biography of LeBel J. on the Supreme Court of Canada’s website 
located online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/lebel/index_e.asp>. As 
counsel in the Finney case, infra, note 62, against the Barreau du Quebec, we were concerned 
about discovering any possible involvement by LeBel J. in the facts that gave rise to the case, 
especially in light of Wewaykum which was released some months earlier. Both Deschamps 
and Fish JJ. had been involved in the Finney case as judges at the Quebec Court of Appeal 
and were likely disqualified from sitting on the case by virtue of s. 30 of the Supreme Court 
Act. We advised the Court and other counsel of this. See Letter of 12 September 2004 from 
A.M. Dodek to Registrar, Supreme Court of Canada in File No. 29344, online at: 
<http://209.47.227.135/information/scc_case/docket_E.asp?caseno=29344>. 
In the course of reviewing documents in the Finney case we discovered that LeBel 
J., had appointed a discipline panel in a matter relating to the case at issue. There was no 
question that this involvement was insufficient to disqualify LeBel J. from the case: the 
discipline panel was disbanded and never heard the complaint; a new batonnier appointed the 
new discipline panel; the act of appointing a discipline panel was an administrative one. In 
short, LeBel J.’s connection with this case was extremely remote both in time and in sub-
stance. However, we raised this issue in a letter to the Registrar because of the possibility that 
it might trigger some further recollection in the mind of LeBel J. or of counsel for the Barreau 
du Quebec if LeBel J. had any deeper involvement in the case. Since our letter did not receive 
any response from the Court or from opposing counsel, it is assumed that LeBel J. had no 
additional recollections or connections to the case. In short, the matter was put to rest in 
advance of the hearing where LeBel J. was one of the coram of seven justices who heard the 
case. See generally Supreme Court File No. 29344 available online at 
<http://209.47.227.135/information/scc_case/docket_E.asp?caseno=29344>. 
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“reasonable apprehension of bias” was the same whether a motion for 
recusal is brought ex ante or whether a motion for disqualification is 
brought after judgment. While strictly speaking, this is correct, the 
Court’s statements indicated that the standard has different components 
in different contexts. 
In addition, the procedures for bringing a motion for recusal differ 
from that of a motion for disqualification. A motion for recusal is tech-
nically made to the Chief Justice because the coram of judges who will 
hear a case is not revealed until the litigants enter the courtroom to ar-
gue their appeal.54 However, it is directed to the judge who is the “tar-
get” of the motion as was the case when one of the parties sought to 
recuse Bastarache J. in the Arsenault-Cameron language rights appeal.55 
In contrast, a motion for disqualification of a particular judge after 
judgment is made to the entire coram that heard the case. This contrasts 
with the American practice where both recusal and disqualification 
motions are made to the target judge.56 
In practice, the threshold for a motion for recusal is lower than a 
motion for disqualification after the fact. This is best demonstrated by 
Iacobucci J.’s statement that “[v]ery few judges insist on sitting where 
they’re not wanted.”57 Unlike the American practice where the recusal 
of one justice will leave a bench of eight and in effect make it harder for 
the appellant to obtain the five votes necessary to succeed on an appeal, 
recusal of a single justice (or two) will not result in an even number of 
justices hearing an appeal and the spectre of an evenly split bench. The 
Chief Justice will simply pair off the recused justice with another justice 
and assign the remaining seven to hear the case (or the Chief Justice 
may decide that only five justices — the minimum quorum — are nec-
essary to the appeal). In any case, the inconvenience or discomfort 
                                                                                                                                
54  While the reasons for this practice have not been made explicit, it would appear to 
prevent the practice of targeting one’s written or oral arguments to a specific bench that will 
hear the appeal. The American practice is for all nine justices to hear each appeal unless one 
is recused. 
55  See Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851, [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 75. 
56  Compare Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (motion to disqualify Rehnquist J. af-
ter judgment rendered) and Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 18 March 2004 (motion to recuse 
Scalia J. before case was heard). 
57  Transcript of Proceedings, supra, note 27, at 40.  
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caused by recusal is minimal which underscores Iacobucci J.’s point and 
also supports the practice of “when in doubt, recuse oneself.”  
(c) The Bar 
As officers of the Court, counsel appearing before the Supreme 
Court have a duty to protect the integrity of the administration of justice. 
Wewaykum raised the issue of counsel’s duty to disclose the potential 
for reasonable apprehension of bias. An undertone of the disqualifica-
tion motion is that counsel for Canada should have discovered Binnie 
J.’s connection to the file earlier and should have disclosed the issue to 
the Court. In addition, from the transcript of the hearing of the motion, it 
is apparent that some members of the Court were perturbed by the pos-
sibility that counsel for one of the other parties may have had reason to 
know about Binnie J.’s past involvement with the case but failed to 
disclose it.58 
The Supreme Court Act enshrines the principle that all persons who 
appear before the Supreme Court are officers of the Court.59 As officers 
of the Court, lawyers have a duty to treat the Court with candour, fair-
ness, courtesy and respect.60 This must be balanced with the lawyer’s 
duty as advocate to represent the client “resolutely, honourably and 
within the limits of the law.”61 However, during the hearing of the dis-
qualification motion, Iacobucci J. clearly articulated that he thought that 
counsel owed a duty as officers of the Court to ensure “that the Court 
functions in as fair and impartial manner as possible.”62  
Lawyers appearing before the Supreme Court should be required to 
act with due diligence to ascertain and disclose potential grounds for a 
judge’s disqualification. At present, no ethical rule or practice guideline 
requires a lawyer to take any steps to ascertain a potential conflict of 
interest or make the court aware of such an issue. In fact, the current 
                                                                                                                                
58  See Transcript of Proceedings in Court File No. 27641, 23 June 2003, at 5, 24-26 
(per Major J.), and at 29 (per Bastarache J.). 
59  Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 24. 
60  See generally Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct, chapter IX, 
Rule and commentary 1. See also Ontario Rule 4.01 and accompanying commentary. 
61  Id. See generally Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibil-
ity and Discipline (Toronto: Carswell, 2004), at 4-60. 
62  Transcript of Proceedings, supra, note 27, at 32 (per Iacobucci J.). 
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state may lead to the analogous situation where one of the parties and 
the judge know of some connection between the judge and the party but 
do not believe that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists so neither 
discloses it to the Court. However, the other party does not know about 
the issue and is left in the dark. If the other party discovers the connec-
tion between the judge and the party after judgment, he or she may have 
cause to complain that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.63 The 
proper course is to follow the suggestion of Iacobucci J. that counsel has 
a duty to at least turn its mind to the issue of possible reasonable appre-
hension of bias.64 
When it comes to disclosure surrounding potential disqualification, 
it is difficult to argue with Brandeis J.’s adage that “sunshine is the best 
disinfectant.”65 The experience of Wewaykum demonstrates that it is 
better to err on the side of disclosure than on the side of keeping mute 
for fear of counsel embarrassing themselves or fear of alienating the 
Court.  
IV.  CONCLUSION  
At the end of the day, Wewaykum is a case about constitutional re-
sponsibility: the responsibility of the bench, the responsibility of counsel 
and the responsibility of the legislature. This close call serves as a warn-
ing to all and demonstrates the need for all three constitutional partners 
to work together to protect the integrity of the system. Wewaykum dem-
onstrates the problems that can arise when they do not. 
                                                                                                                                
63  These are the facts in Finney v. Barreau du Quebec, 2004 SCC 36 (Respondent 
Christina Finney argued, inter alia, that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed because of 
the trial judge’s past connections to the corporate defendant, some individual defendants and 
several witnesses none of which were ever disclosed during the course of her trial). The 
Supreme Court did not address this issue. 
64  Transcript of Proceedings, supra, note 27, at 32. 
65  Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, Richard M. 
Abrams, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), at 62. 
 
 
